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Abstract  
 In this study, the price movements of Volkswagen Company's shares 
traded in Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX) have been studied on the course of  
before, after and the emergence of the Volkswagen emission scandal. In 
addition to analysis of price movements of the Volkswagen company, Dogus 
Automotive's, makes Volkswagen Company's distributor in Turkey, shares 
traded in the Turkish National Index have been analyzed. In the study, the 
price movements of the Volkswagen and Dogus Automotive stocks have 
been examined by using case study methodology in the process of emission 
scandal. In the case study method, the event window consists of the pre-
event and post-event 20 business days together with the event day. To 
estimate the ordinary returns of the Volkswagen's and Dogus Automotive's 
shares, the market model has been utilized. The data used in the market 
model consist of 5 years, from January 2010 to May 2015 when emission 
scandal obviously publicized,  daily closing price. The significance of the 
differences between estimated returns and realized returns, in other words, 
abnormal returns have been tested by using t-statistics. As a result, the 
process of the Volkswagen emission scandal shows that investors reflect the 
bad news announcements, potential financial distress such as compensation 
obligations, in other words, developments that will put the company in 
trouble to stock prices.  
 
Keywords: Finance, Financial Distress, Event Study Methodology, 
Emission Scandal 
 
Introduction 
 The possible results of the legal process, faced by the companies, 
such as bankruptcy proceedings, claims for compensations in terms of  
litigant party and defendant party and within this context, the effects of such 
legal process on the stock prices have become a major issue attracting the 
researchers' attention in recent years. The reaction of the market to the legal 
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processes such as an action for damages, bankruptcy cases can lead to a 
significant effect on the firm value.  Huge firm value losses can emerge from 
the decisions taken by the courts. However, prospects for a compromise 
between the parties can reverse this effect.  Together with this situation, all 
the studies about the impact that the outcomes of this legal process is not yet 
sufficient.  
 Firm value varies depending on the present value of future expected 
cash flows. The value of the equity and the debt can also arise from the result 
of the allocation of a certain percentage of this cash flow. In this context, the 
unmarketable rights like bankruptcy costs and the compensations have the 
meaning of the transfer value from the marketable rights such as debt and 
equity. Within the framework of the value maximization's objectives, the 
executives keep these transferred rights at the lowest level and be involved in 
the activities that maximize the securities of the company. The pricing of 
securities representing the equity, the market value arises from expectations 
regarding the impact of the transfer of such rights. Various legal events such 
as litigation, court decisions provide an information to the market about 
future compensation obligations that court ruled or expected value of the 
payments which is reached an agreement on. When these payments are at a 
significant level for the company, the litigations affect the systematic risk of 
the firm thereby affect the company. If the lawsuit course is ended up 
unexpectedly, the market changes the expectations about the expected value 
of the payments and this changing process actualizes expeditiously (Fields, 
1990;145-146). 
 There are various reasons giving rise to value loss experienced in the 
litigation process. The size of the legal fees related to litigation, transaction 
costs, conducting the lawsuit and the behavioral reasons can be counted 
among these reasons. The hypothesis of the transaction costs has an 
importance within these reasons. Businesses enter into many contracts that 
are both explicit and implicit. According to this hypothesis, the defendant 
company bears upon additional costs associated with the agency and auditing 
of the related case. Suppliers, customers, other companies involved in the 
company's distribution channel and employees less willing to act in tacit 
agreement and forced to make more costly agreements containing restrictive 
measures with respect to the defendant firm. In this situation, the company is 
losing its financial flexibility and the possibility of violating restrictive 
measures increases. This significantly reduces the likelihood to engage in 
profitable investment (Fields, 1990;145-147). In this case, that is also called 
short-term focusing, the company managers have to turn their attention to the 
short term. In addition to this, the Company may refrain from assessing long-
term investment opportunities. In particular, a company facing the 
uncertainty in the legal process, large compensation payments and in parallel 
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with the financial distress risk that may occur, will be able to ignore the 
investment opportunities that can be taken into account in more normal times 
or in other words when the company is far away from the boredom 
conditions (Branch, 2002:50). If  the court makes a decision on bankruptcy at 
the end of the legal process, limitations with regard to the activities are 
starting to emerge more clearly. For example, suppliers are becoming insist 
on cash payments (Fields, 1990;145-146). If suppliers begin to look their 
relations with the company as a short-term relationship, the bargaining 
process which is an appropriate period of time, price and after-sales service, 
can be reduced (Wruck, 437-438).   
 In all this framework the effect of the decisions taken in the legal 
process on the shareholders was investigated in studies carried out up until 
today. For instance Fields (1990), Cutler and Summers (1988) come to a 
conclusion that in terms of the defendant and litigant companies, the reaction 
of the market is asymmetric to the case process. The total loss of the 
defending party emerged in the legal process is more than litigant party. In 
this context, Cutler and Summers (1988) calculated the stressful situation 
emerged after Texaco and Penzoil's  Getty Oil buying and the process of the 
reconstruction costs with the help of excessive increase/decrease  in the 
value of both companies' securities in their case study. In this process, 
Penzoil was able to get only 682 million $ increase in value, while the 
decline of the Texaco's  market value was 4.1 billion $. This loss represents 
32% of the pre-trial value. After the agreement, a part of the total value loss 
disappeared. At the end of this process, the total value decrease of the right 
holder is approximately 2 billion $. Cutter and Summers mentioned that 
there can be two different explanations for the decline and stated that the first 
explanation is the direct costs paid by the company. But, Cutter and 
Summers also contended that these costs are very low when to compare the 
total value loss. As another reason the secondary type costs had an effect on 
Texaco's profitability was indicated in that study. These costs have increased 
uncertainty about Texaco's long-term financial capability, made difficult to 
find credit to firms and distracted the Texaco's executives from their 
principal occupation. In addition, the lawsuit process has caused to lose more 
than the amount needed to provide the Penzoil. Cutler and Summers stated 
that this financial dispute has a significant impact on the productivity of the 
companies and concluded that as an explanatory of the selection of the 
capital structure, the financial distress is costly. With respect to this effect, it 
was indicated in the document filed by Texaco in court for bankruptcy that 
some suppliers demanded cash payments before doing business or insisted 
assured (collateral) payments, while others temporarily suspended sending 
raw material or completely canceled. It was also stated at the end of the 
document that supplying and getting the funding source became difficult day 
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by day for Texaco, and this situation brought to a halt the Texaco's 
operations (Cutler and Summers, 1988;166-170). 
 Equity investors are adversely affected by the undesirable situation 
revealed by the process of the court case for the company. Because the 
defendant company to come to into a more risky situation leads to an effect 
of increasing the cost of equity. In particular, if the company had difficulty 
finding a fund, this effect could be greater (Fields, 1990;145-148). Therefore, 
this situation is reflected in the company's stock prices. 
 In our study, it has examined the effect of the legal process on the 
defendant company's and other companies', the official distributor of the 
related company, stock prices as unlike from the study that examines the 
price movements of the stock prices by Fields (1990), Cutler and Summers 
(1988) in terms of defending and litigant companies.  
 
Research Method 
 In this part of our study, the Volkswagen company imposed sanctions 
by American and Canadian court and one of the firms that company's 
distribution company Dogus Automotive were analyzed by using the Event 
Study Methodology.  
 The Event Study Methodology was examined in the studies exercised 
by Boehmer et al. (1991), Strong (1992), Agrawal and Kamakura (1995 
Binder (1998). The Event Study Methodology was clarified  in detail, 
especially in the study that carried out by Strong (1992). This methodology 
examines the impact of the relevant event to company's market performance 
when an event which is important for the company arise (Benninga, 2008: 
371). In addition, the methodology is on the basis of the present value of the 
discounted cash flow gained by the company (Duso et al., 2010:187). In this 
methodology, the stock price abnormal returns of the company emerged 
associated with that company is calculated and examined the abnormal 
returns and losses of the shareholders (Peterson, 1989: 36). With the help of 
calculating abnormal returns, the unexpected event that is specific to the 
company can be  gauged (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997: 626). When we 
look at this aspect that is to say calculating the abnormal returns and 
employing the market model, the Event Study Methodology is the method 
that is used frequently in the field of finance and accounting (Peterson, 1989: 
36, McWilliams and Siegel, 1997: 626). Especially in the context of the 
efficient market hypothesis, the unexpected events' impact which is specific 
to firm on the company's stock price is expected to be on the day and after. 
In other words, the abnormal returns that take place simultaneously with the 
relevant event are associated with that event(Im et al., 2001: 104).  
 Event Study Methodology has comprised three-time windows. These 
windows are event window, estimation window and post-event window 
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(Benninga, 2008: 371). After specifying  the  time windows, the Event Study 
Methodology is exercised in the form of three steps. These relevant steps 
indicated in the Strong's (1992) study are arrayed below.  
 Selection of the pre-event and post-event days. 
 Identification of the model estimating the normal returns and 
calculation of the abnormal returns and the cumulative abnormal returns with 
the help of this model. 
 Measurement the test statistics of the abnormal returns calculated by 
the market model. 
 In our study, firstly we specified the event day, pre-event day, post-
event day and control period to use for the estimation model calculating the 
expected, i.e., normal returns. The date when the commission created jointly 
by the United State and Canada announced that the Volkswagen Group is 
found guilty is determined as the event day. As the event window, previous 
and next twenty business days were examined according to the event day. 
Finally, estimation window was created from January 2010 to May 2015 in 
the form of daily data. The event window analyzed the pre-event and post-
event period together with the event day is shown as below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 After specifying the estimation window, the normal returns, i.e., 
expected returns were calculated by employing the market model created  
with the help of daily stock price data covered approximately 5 years. 
Furthermore, the market model studied by Beaver et al. (1979) was 
employed in the calculation of the abnormal returns that is the difference 
between the realized return and expected return. The market model is the 
regression model that is on the assumption that there is a linear relationship 
between the related firm and its market index Benninga, 2008: 373, 
MacKinlay, 1997: 15). For any i firm, the market model can be shown below 
as a mathematical form(Beaver, 1979: 18). 
itmtiiit RR εβα ~~~ ++=  
 itR~ = The calculated return of the stock i at time t by utilizing the 
market model, that is to say, the expected return of the i stock. 
+20 -20 0 
Pre- Event Days Post- Event Days 
Event Day 
Event Study Window 
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 mtR~ = The return of the index or market used for the calculation of the 
return of the stock i at time t. 
 iα = The constant of the model that is used for the calculation of the 
return of the stock i. 
 iβ = The slope of the model that is used for the calculation of the 
return of the stock i. 
 itε~ =  The abnormal returns, i.e., the unsystematic return of stock i. 
 It is possible that the abnormal returns calculated for the event 
window are shown as below (Mackinlay, 1997: 15).  
)/( tititit XRERAR −=  
 The figures that have taken part above ARit, Rit, E(Rit / Xt) is 
abnormal, realized and expected returns of the stock i. In the calculating 
stage, the returns that are realized returns of the relevant firm before the 
event day, in other words, the estimation window was utilized. The 
cumulative abnormal returns were calculated in an attempt to examine the 
total effect over the course of the event, after calculating the abnormal 
returns. The cumulative abnormal returns were also calculated for the pre-
event days so as to examine whether there is any information leakage about 
Volkswagen Group before the event -the economic sanction- in the context 
of Efficient Market Hypothesis.  The cumulative abnormal returns were also 
calculated for the pre-event and post-event period by using a formula that is 
shown below. 
∑
=
−=
− =
20
20
,20,20,
τ
τ
τii ARCAR  
 tCAR = The cumulative abnormal return of the stock i in any day of 
the event window. 
 τ,iAR = The abnormal return of the stock i in any day of the event 
window. 
 In conclusion, after calculating the cumulative abnormal returns, the 
average abnormal returns that are in the related event window were testing 
with the statistical aspect. Starting on the basis that is the abnormal returns of 
the stock prices of the both companies that are Volkswagen Group and 
Dogus Automotive are normally distributed were analyzed the statistical 
significance of each average abnormal returns of the companies in the event 
window by employing t-test just like in the studies exercised by Beaver et al. 
(1979), Binder (1998), Duso et al. (2010) Babacan and Ozer (2013). The 
statistical significance of the average abnormal returns of the both companies 
in the event window was shown in the next section. 
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Outputs Of The Study 
 Firstly, we utilized the market model in order to calculate abnormal 
and cumulative abnormal returns of the Volkswagen Group's and Dogus 
Automotive's stocks in the event window. In the composing of the market 
model, the daily returns of both companies in the event window were not 
included. The daily returns for using market model has covered the period 
starting from January 2010 to May 2015. The market model is on the basis 
that is the stock prices and its stock market is in the relationship linearly as 
we explained before in the previous section. 
 In our study, we carried out a regression analysis between stock 
returns and market returns so as to calculate the normal and abnormal returns 
of the Volkswagen Group's and Dogus Automotive's stocks. Prior to regress, 
the stock returns with the market returns, we employed unit root test both 
companies' stock returns and their market returns. The aim of employing the 
unit root test just before the regression analysis is to test the stationeries of 
both stocks and market indexes. The meaning of the stationary is that the 
time series's variance and the average are zero, in other words, the time 
series have a mean - reversion tendency (Bahar, 2006: 142). In the condition 
that the time series is not stationary, the estimation model for the event 
window would not unbiased and efficient and the fake regression problem 
would arise. We used  Dickey and Fuller's (1979) and Phillips and Perron's 
(1988) tests as unit root tests. The unit root tests of the Volkswagen's Group 
and Dogus Automotive's stock returns and both stock's indexes is shown in 
the table as below. 
Table 1:The Unit Root Tests Of The Volkswagen Group. 
 
 
Table 2:The Unit Root Tests Of The Dogus Automotive and Bist100. 
  
 After employing the unit root tests the statistics and probability 
values were shown in table 1 and table 2. When we look at the statistical 
t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value
LEVEL LEVEL
DAX -34.71642 0.0000 -34.71262 0.0000 DAX -34.67946 0.0000 -34.67731 0.0000
VW -34.70583 0.0000 -34.69348 0.0000 VW -34.6763 0.0000 -34.66375 0.0000
Volkswagen Group'un Birim Kök Testleri
Sabit Sabit ve Trend
AUGMENTED DİCKEY FULLER
Sabit Sabit ve Trend
PHILLIPS-PERRON
t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value
LEVEL LEVEL
BIST100 -37.80158 0.0000 -37.78756 0.0000 BIST100 -37.80512 0.0000 -37.79105 0.0000
DOGUS -33.64515 0.0000 -33.63398 0.0000 DOGUS -33.63583 0.0000 -33.6246 0.0000
Dogus Otomotiv
AUGMENTED DİCKEY FULLER PHILLIPS-PERRON
Sabit Sabit ve Trend Sabit Sabit ve Trend
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significance of the related statistics, we reject the null hypothesis that  there 
is a unit root in level for both stocks and indexes. In other words, we can say 
that the Volkswagen Group, Dax, Dogus Automotive and Bist100 series are  
stationary. 
 After testing the stationary of both companies and indexes, the output 
of the regression models created for both stocks is displayed below in table 3 
and table 4. 
Table 3: The Regression Model Output of The Volkswagen Group. 
 
 
 When we look at the model in table 3 the slope of the regression 
model that is the coefficient of the Dax is significant at %1 confidence level. 
The constant of the model is also not significant for all %10, %5 and %1 
confidence levels. The explanatory power of the Dax index returns is %50. 
For this reason, we can say that the explanatory power of the market model 
is sufficient for the analysis. According to the model that is shown in the 
above section, the mathematical form of the market model of the 
Volkswagen Group is taking place below with model's output figures. 
DAXVW RR ~05113.1000426.0~ ⋅+=  
Table 4: The Regression Model Output of The Dogus Automotive. 
  
 When we also look at table 4 the Bist 100 index returns are 
significant at %1 significance level. In addition to the significance of the 
coefficient of the Bist 100, when we look at the constant of the model, we 
can say that the model constant is significant at %10 and %5 significance 
level but not significant at %1 significance level. We can finally say that for 
the model the explanatory power is %36. Then we can also say that the 
explanatory power is enough for the event study analysis. Moreover, the 
expected return for the Dogus Automotive's stocks is shown as below with 
model's output figures. 
100
~048226.1001098.0~ BISTDogus RR ⋅+=  
 Following  the regression model created in order to calculate the 
abnormal returns of the companies and test this abnormal returns with a 
statistical aspect, for each event, pre-event and post-event days that is in the 
event study window  the normal returns of the stocks were calculated. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Errort-Statistic Prob. Std. ErrorR-SquaredAdj. R-Squared
DAX 1.05113 0.028167 37.31722 0.0000
C 0.000426 0.000356 1.198177 0.2311
Volkswagen
0.507022 0.5066580.013083
Variable Coefficient Std. Errort-Statistic Prob. Std. ErrorR-SquaredAdj. R-Squared
BIST100 1.048226 0.037388 28.03643 0.0000
C 0.001098 0.000558 1.966694 0.0494
Dogus
0.020434 0.369895 0.369424
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Subsequent to this we subtracted the abnormal returns estimated by 
employing the market model from actual returns and then calculated the 
abnormal returns. In addition, we analyzed the statistical significance of the 
average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns. The 
statistical significance of both average abnormal returns and cumulative 
average abnormal returns were tested by t-test statistics. Also, we use the 
cumulative abnormal statistics for the reason that we can exhibit the total 
effect of the Volkswagen emission scandal. Volkswagen and Dogus 
companies' expected, realized, abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns in 
the event study window are demonstrated below as tables and graphs. 
Table 5: The Abnormal Returns and Statistical Significance Of The Volkswagen Group. 
 
Date Event Day Real Return Expected Return AR CRR CAR
21.08.2015 -20 -0.01814936 -0.030574314 0.011343 -0.01814936 0.012424954
24.08.2015 -19 -0.039090909 -0.049001774 0.007933 -0.057240269 0.022335818
25.08.2015 -18 0.058341217 0.052684922 0.008624 0.001100948 0.027992114
26.08.2015 -17 -0.01102503 -0.013137443 0.001879 -0.009924082 0.030104527
27.08.2015 -16 0.031334739 0.033880503 -0.00049 0.021410657 0.027558763
28.08.2015 -15 -0.003797838 -0.001315419 -0.00214 0.017612819 0.025076343
31.08.2015 -14 -0.02228739 -0.00356172 -0.01849 -0.004674571 0.006350673
01.09.2015 -13 -0.028494301 -0.024561679 -0.00472 -0.033168872 0.002418051
02.09.2015 -12 -0.015128126 0.003834763 -0.01837 -0.048296998 -0.016544838
03.09.2015 -11 0.030721003 0.028648826 0.003871 -0.017575995 -0.01447266
04.09.2015 -10 -0.027068127 -0.028078626 5E-05 -0.044644121 -0.01346216
07.09.2015 -9 0.007502344 0.007815714 0.000472 -0.037141777 -0.01377553
08.09.2015 -8 0.026372944 0.017349336 0.010273 -0.010768832 -0.004751922
09.09.2015 -7 0.025392987 0.003676192 0.022301 0.014624154 0.016964873
10.09.2015 -6 -0.015919811 -0.009029265 -0.00692 -0.001295657 0.010074327
11.09.2015 -5 -0.003894548 -0.008518 0.004614 -0.005190205 0.014697779
14.09.2015 -4 -0.004511278 0.00127533 -0.00532 -0.009701483 0.008911171
15.09.2015 -3 0.0081571 0.006276251 0.002591 -0.001544383 0.01079202
16.09.2015 -2 0.003895715 0.004457963 5.99E-05 0.002351332 0.010229772
17.09.2015 -1 -0.000597015 0.000669583 -0.00083 0.001754317 0.008963173
18.09.2015 0 -0.03614098 -0.031779151 -0.0055 -0.03614098 -0.004361829
21.09.2015 1 -0.171366594 0.003855156 -0.17463 -0.207507574 -0.179583579
22.09.2015 2 -0.16828721 -0.039496508 -0.13031 -0.375794784 -0.308374281
23.09.2015 3 0.069244604 0.005034398 0.06486 -0.30655018 -0.244164075
24.09.2015 4 0 -0.019801371 0.019243 -0.30655018 -0.224362705
25.09.2015 5 -0.028174937 0.0295138 -0.05585 -0.334725117 -0.282051441
28.09.2015 6 -0.073128516 -0.021812733 -0.05197 -0.407853633 -0.333367225
29.09.2015 7 -0.035480859 -0.003248253 -0.03199 -0.443334492 -0.365599831
30.09.2015 8 0.015972894 0.023787905 -0.00625 -0.427361597 -0.373414841
01.10.2015 9 0.000952835 -0.016024632 0.016603 -0.426408762 -0.356437375
02.10.2015 10 -0.037125178 0.005269759 -0.04173 -0.463533941 -0.398832312
05.10.2015 11 0.016312407 0.029223208 -0.01108 -0.447221534 -0.411743113
06.10.2015 12 0.039883268 0.009854779 0.030913 -0.407338265 -0.381714623
07.10.2015 13 0.074836296 0.007598177 0.068013 -0.33250197 -0.314476505
08.10.2015 14 0.011314186 0.002815986 0.00904 -0.321187783 -0.305978305
09.10.2015 15 0.083476764 0.011315896 0.073117 -0.237711019 -0.233817436
12.10.2015 16 0.052025417 0.002844413 0.049725 -0.185685602 -0.184636432
13.10.2015 17 -0.013967535 -0.008611585 -0.00537 -0.199653137 -0.189992383
14.10.2015 18 -0.015313936 -0.011828847 -0.00366 -0.214967073 -0.193477471
15.10.2015 19 -0.037325039 0.01621545 -0.05235 -0.252292112 -0.24701796
16.10.2015 20 -0.021001616 0.004564809 -0.02494 -0.273293727 -0.272584384
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Graph 1: The Abnormal, Actual, Cumulative Abnormal, Cumulative Actual Returns Of The 
Volkswagen Group Stocks. 
 
 
 We demonstrated the actual, abnormal, cumulative actual (real) and 
cumulative abnormal returns  of the Volkswagen Group stocks in table 5. In 
addition to this data, we mentioned previous sentence the statistical 
significance and t statistics of the average abnormal returns and the 
cumulative average abnormal returns also takes place. When we look at the 
datum shown in table 5, we can say that there is no significant decrease prior 
to the event days in the Volkswagen stock prices, but when we give attention 
to the post-event days the significant decrease can be observed in that stock. 
We can clearly see the capital loss of the Volkswagen Group. The 
Volkswagen Group stocks were not on the significant decline of the event 
day that is 18th September 2015. The reason why Volkswagen Group stock 
prices were not on the significant decline on the commission's decision date 
is the time difference between The United States and Germany. The German 
National Index (Dax) were not opened When the commission reached a 
decision for the Volkswagen Group. The first business day after the court 
decision, the Volkswagen Group stocks sharply decreased up to 
approximately %17 and the business day after this day the stocks diminished 
again up to about %9,8. The total amount of the decrease of the Volkswagen 
shares is about to %23 in two days after the event. In addition to this, 
Volkswagen shares were not decreased so much before the event days. We 
can conclude from this situation, there is no information leakage about the 
court decision. Eventually, we can say that the total decrease of the 
Volkswagen stock prices reached up to %44,7. 
  
Volkswagen  
CAR AR RR CRR
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Table 6: The Abnormal Returns and Statistical Significance Of The Volkswagen Group. 
   
Date Event Day Real Return Expected Return AR CRR CAR
21/8/2015 -20 -0.057971014 -0.011310708 -0.046660306 -0.057971014 -0.046660306
24/8/2015 -19 -0.076923077 -0.04622913 -0.030693947 -0.134894091 -0.077354254
25/8/2015 -18 0.016666667 0.046377891 -0.029711224 -0.118227425 -0.107065478
26/8/2015 -17 0.032786885 0.00261238 0.030174506 -0.08544054 -0.076890972
27/8/2015 -16 0.031746032 0.018150347 0.013595685 -0.053694508 -0.063295287
28/8/2015 -15 -0.019230769 -0.001310244 -0.017920526 -0.072925277 -0.081215813
31/8/2015 -14 -0.019607843 0.009085496 -0.028693339 -0.09253312 -0.109909152
1/9/2015 -13 -0.024 -0.021768991 -0.002231009 -0.11653312 -0.112140161
2/9/2015 -12 -0.004098361 0.002329889 -0.006428249 -0.120631481 -0.11856841
3/9/2015 -11 -0.037037037 0.006050652 -0.043087689 -0.157668518 -0.161656099
4/9/2015 -10 -0.051282051 -0.013831588 -0.037450463 -0.208950569 -0.199106562
7/9/2015 -9 0.027027027 -0.01448225 0.041509277 -0.181923542 -0.157597285
8/9/2015 -8 0.026315789 0.003810536 0.022505254 -0.155607753 -0.135092031
9/9/2015 -7 -0.004273504 0.000393138 -0.004666643 -0.159881257 -0.139758674
10/9/2015 -6 -0.004291845 -0.001184989 -0.003106857 -0.164173102 -0.14286553
11/9/2015 -5 0 -0.006133432 0.006133432 -0.164173102 -0.136732099
14/9/2015 -4 0.025862069 0.000342287 0.025519781 -0.138311033 -0.111212317
15/9/2015 -3 0.021008403 0.028647893 -0.00763949 -0.11730263 -0.118851807
16/9/2015 -2 -0.012345679 0.015081013 -0.027426692 -0.129648309 -0.146278498
17/9/2015 -1 -0.016666667 0.012846981 -0.029513648 -0.146314976 -0.175792146
18/9/2015 0 -0.021186441 0.002754207 -0.023940648 -0.021186441 -0.023940648
21/9/2015 1 0.038961039 0.011729326 0.027231713 0.017774598 0.003291065
22/9/2015 2 -0.033333333 -0.010881872 -0.022451462 -0.015558735 -0.019160397
23/9/2015 3 -0.012931034 -0.004262518 -0.008668516 -0.02848977 -0.027828913
28/9/2015 4 -0.135371179 -0.017098879 -0.1182723 -0.163860949 -0.146101213
29/9/2015 5 0.011111111 0.014575745 -0.003464634 -0.152749837 -0.149565846
30/9/2015 6 -0.030969031 0.000361424 -0.031330455 -0.183718868 -0.180896301
1/10/2015 7 -0.003092784 0.00569587 -0.008788653 -0.186811652 -0.189684954
2/10/2015 8 0.002068252 -0.000790977 0.002859229 -0.1847434 -0.186825725
5/10/2015 9 0.021671827 0.036405222 -0.014733396 -0.163071573 -0.201559121
6/10/2015 10 0.015151515 0.005951167 0.009200348 -0.147920058 -0.192358773
7/10/2015 11 0.039800995 0.020629876 0.019171119 -0.108119063 -0.173187653
8/10/2015 12 -0.009569378 0.000603311 -0.010172689 -0.117688441 -0.183360342
9/10/2015 13 0.004830918 0.008479195 -0.003648277 -0.112857523 -0.187008619
12/10/2015 14 0.028846154 0.002224895 0.026621259 -0.084011369 -0.160387361
13/10/2015 15 -0.004672897 -0.011346927 0.00667403 -0.088684266 -0.153713331
14/10/2015 16 0.03286385 0.014764643 0.018099207 -0.055820417 -0.135614124
15/10/2015 17 -0.022727273 -0.000446736 -0.022280537 -0.078547689 -0.157894661
16/10/2015 18 -0.03255814 -0.009213364 -0.023344776 -0.111105829 -0.181239437
19/10/2015 19 0.028846154 0.017806218 0.011039936 -0.082259675 -0.170199501
20/10/2015 20 -0.014018692 0.011114805 -0.025133496 -0.096278367 -0.195332997
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Graph 2: The Abnormal, Actual, Cumulative Abnormal, Cumulative Actual Returns Of The 
Dogus Automotive Stocks. 
 
 
 When we also look at table 6 we can see the Dogus Automotive's 
actual, abnormal, cumulative actual and cumulative abnormal returns over 
the course of the event window. In addition to this, when we analyze the 
table 6 and the graph 2, we can say that the Dogus Automotive's stocks do 
not decrease in value. As a matter of fact, the stock prices increase in value, 
unlike the Volkswagen shares. But the Dogus Automotive stocks decreased 
in significant value up to the event day. In other words, the Dogus 
Automotive shares response partially in advance to the event. In addition to 
this information, the total loss of the Dogus Automotive shares reached up to 
approximately  %18,7. Finally, when we look at this scandal with another 
point of view, the investors of the Dogus Automotive started to price out the 
shares previous to Volkswagen investors and this pricing out likely stem 
from possible supply and future sale problems of the company. 
 Subsequent to the emergence of the Volkswagen emission scandal, 
the cumulative abnormal returns exhibiting the total value loss that is 
observed for both companies is shown as below on the Graph 3. 
Graph 3: The Cumulative Abnormal Returns Of The Volkswagen Group and Dogus 
Automotive. 
 
DOGUS  
CAR AR RR CRR
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 As it is seen in the Graph 3 the Volkswagen emission scandal was 
priced out differently by  German and Turkish security investors. The Dogus 
Automotive's stock prices were not a loss in significant value after the event 
when Volkswagen stock was. Because the Dogus Automotives' investors 
already priced out of the event as demonstrated in the before graph and table. 
The total value loss of the Dogus Automotive's stock prices was 
approximately %18,7 when the total value loss of the Volkswagen Group 
was %44,7 throughout the event days. 
 
Conclusion 
 In our study, we observed major losses  for both companies. After the 
publicizing the economic sanctions, the Volkswagen stock investors sold 
their shares with the thought that the company can be in the financial distress 
in the near future. Also, the Dogus Automotive investors reflected the 
possibility of the car supply and the sale problem to related stocks. In 
addition to outputs and results obtained from this study, the Volkswagen 
emission scandal can be analyzed and examined with another point of view. 
The event day and event period can be differently exercised or the expected 
returns can be estimated by employing another model apart from market 
model. In this way, the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns can be 
calculated more accurately and then the effect of the event can be measured 
more effectively. 
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